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Abstract—Nowadays privacy in the connected world is a big
user’s concern. The ubiquity of mobile devices permits billions
of users browse the web at anytime, anywhere. Near Field
Communication (NFC) appeared as a seamlessly and simply
communication protocol between devices. Commercial services
such as Android Pay, and Apple Pay offer contactless payment
methods that are spreading in more and more scenarios. However,
we take risks while using NFC on Android devices, we can be
hacked, and our privacy can be affected. In this paper we study
the current vulnerabilities in the NFC-Android ecosystem. We
conduct a series of experiments and we expose that with NFC and
Android devices are vulnerable to URL/URI spoofing, Bank/social
network information hacking, and user’s device tracking via
fingerprint and geo-location. It is important for the community
to understand the problem and come up solution that can tackle
these issues and inform the users about privacy awareness and
risks on using these contactless services.
I. INTRODUCTION
The web has become an essential part of our society and
it is currently the main medium of information delivery.
Billions of users browse the web on a daily basis, and
there are single websites that have reached over one billion
user accounts. In this environment, the ability to track users
and their online habits can be very lucrative for advertising
companies, yet very intrusive for the privacy of users. Many
we services and Internet service providers (ISPs) aims to track
the mobility and usage patterns of client hosts, the so-called
device fingerprinting ([1]). The raising awareness of privacy
concerns is illustrated in the cookies, location browser pop-up
notification messages. Device fingerprinting using the browser
as the information channel is a main concern in the privacy
field as it raises the conflict between adaptability and user
privacy. Fingerprinting techniques are still in the newspapers
as it appeared to be the recent suspicious method to track
Uber1 Apple users2. If we want to have more user friendly
individual characteristics user interface (UI) in the ubiquitous
connected world, we might need to open some doors to
developers to enable them to access this individual features.
However, this open door is not always used to improve the
user experience (UX) but to collect individual information,
the fingerprint, where our traces in this connected world can
be uniquely identify.
1www.uber.com
2https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-
uber-and-himself-to-the-precipice.html? r=0
The forthcoming Internet of things (IoT) paradigm is step-
ping inside our lives, since modern smartphones, we have
been surrounded for myriad of sensors to improve our lives
such as sensor networks, wearable devices. NFC protocol
has received special attention in many research studies and
commercial systems as an efficient and simple approach to
interact with the IoT ecosystem. NFC main features are
low energy requirements and its limited data transmission in
comparison with other wireless protocols such as Bluetooth,
WiFi. Despite its prevalent use in current mobile networks,
there are several existing or potential vulnerabilities of NFC
protocols. In [2], the authors investigate a wide range of these
weaknesses including eavesdropping, URI obfuscation, tag
tampering, relay attacks, data corruption, man in the middle
and worms. It also provides possible detection and mitigation
mechanisms towards each of these susceptibilities. Most NFC
communications do not include an encryption mechanism
since it assumes that the short communication range (i.e., less
than 4 cm) can guarantee the security. However, as we describe
in Section III, there are several studied vulnerabilities with the
NFC protocol.
Due to the ubiquity of NFC as a fast, simple protocol for
small data transactions such as public transport, contactless
payments, and building access (hotel rooms) (Figure 1), we
need to be aware of the vulnerabilities that our mobile devices
can face. Some of the real world applications require high
security measurements to avoid attacks (i.e., payments, loca-
tion access). In this paper we depict the main vulnerabilities
regarding the NFC protocol. Besides we propose some innova-
tive attacks to gather user’s device information (fingerprinting),
geo-location data gathering without permission requests, social
network, bank accounts and Android device hacks. We address
these security threads and come up with some solutions
to overcome the risks of these contactless communication
scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we depict the NFC protocol, modes, and features. Then,
in Section III we describe the NFC vulnerabilities and our
findings. In Section IV we evaluate the found NFC vulnera-
bility and in Section V we give some feasible solutions. In
Section VI, we present the literature review and place our
research study in the field. Finally, in Section VII we conclude
the work of our findings and the possible solutions.
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(a) Transport (https:
//securityintelligence.com/is-nfc-
still-a-vulnerable-technology/)
(b) Contactless payment (http:
//www.himanshutech.com/what-
is-nfc/)
(c) Supermarket with
NFC tags product labeling
(http://www.rfidjournal.com/
articles/view?8793/2)
(d) NFC-tag closeup
(http://www.androidauthority.
com/nfc-tags-explained-271872/)
Fig. 1: NFC application examples
II. NFC CHARACTERISTICS
NFC is a set of protocols that enables the wireless com-
munication between two electronic devices, within a distance
less than 4 cm. We can see NFC communications in public
transport systems, offices buildings as access cards, and also
in the commercial contactless payments from VISA, Apple,
and Google. The NFC protocol consumes very little energy
and its transmission speed capabilities are limited to less
than 500 Kbps. Although, it is not a protocol to be consider
in scenarios with high bandwidth requirements, it has been
proposed as another option against QR codes, and channel
to create secure WiFi communication between devices (i.e.,
cameras send the required information to create a secure WiFi
connection camera-smartphone).
There are two type of devices to interact via NFC: NFC-full
devices, NFC active device that can interact with other NFC
peers; NFC tags, NFC passive data stores that can be read
or written by another NFC-full device. The NFC-full devices
can work in three different modes: (1) Card emulation mode: it
enables mobile devices such as smartphones to act like an NFC
card that an external NFC-reader can access. In example the
NFC point-of-sale scenario. (2) Reader/writer mode: it enables
the NFC device to read/write NFC-tags. (3) Peer-to-peer mode:
it allows the NFC device to exchange data with other NFC
peers, called Android Beam for Android devices.
NFC support has started since Android3 version 2.3 (Gin-
gerbread), December, 2010. Android Beam has started in later
versions, since 4.0.1 (ICS). More complex NFC modes such as
Host Card Emulation (HCE) have been supported since version
4.4.x (KitKat). Android devices need to be unlocked in order
to interact with other NFC device4. Android Beam allows
Android supported devices to transmit data via NFC. Although
we will no cover any vulnerability using this Android feature,
there exists some risks allowing the transmission of any data
just approaching both devices together. The attacker can place
an Android device in some non-visible location to the user
and activate Android Beam once the user’s device are back
3https://www.android.com/
4https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/nfc/nfc.html
Fig. 2: NFC Point of sale eavesdropping attack example
to back, this action will start the data transmission (i.e., URL,
file).
III. NFC VULNERABILITIES
In this Section we will describe some documented NFC
vulnerabilities and other possible protocol weakness of the
ecosystem NFC-Android devices. For the latter, due to the
myriad of devices and Android OS versions combinations
not all the mentioned vulnerabilities affect the devices analo-
gously.
Lack of security protection of communication. Most NFC
communications do not include encryption mechanisms during
its data exchange, it relies on the short range (i.e., less than 4
cm) to guarantee absence of eavesdropping attacks. However,
the attacker can still place the device (i.e., NFC tag or NFC
reader/writer) between client and NFC provider (i.e., NFC
contactless point-of-sale) to trigger a specific attack such as
eavesdrop, URL/URI spoofing see Figure 2. This vulnerability
can also be exploited to jam the data exchange between two
parties by sending out specific packet at the right timing, which
can lead to a deny-of-service (DoS) attack toward the NFC-
service provider.
URL/URI spoofing. In [3], the authors show that spoofing
attacks can be performed to trick the user to see the false
Fig. 3: NFC tag-device replacement
information as a valid one. In example, the attacker will design
an exactly copy of a user’s trusted website with an almost
equal URL so the user does not see the difference if she
is not cautious. In addition, to uniform resource identifier
(URI) and uniform/universal resource locater (URL) spoofing
the research shows that phone call and text-message spoofing
using the NFC protocol are also applicable. Furthermore, URI
and URL spoofing are specially useful in combination with
other attacks (i.e., cross-site request forgery).
Lack of authentication mechanism of NFC device. When
the NFC reader reads information from another NFC-enabled
device, there is not any authentication mechanisms available.
Therefore, there is a potential risk of tag replacement and tag
hiding (TRTH) attack. In the TRTH scenario, the NFC tags
are overwritten by an attacker with malicious information or
the physical tag is replace with another tag prepared by the
attacker, see Figure 3.
Automatic and non-user intervention URL/URI connection.
The proposed attack takes advantage of the non-user inter-
vention when the device detects another NFC device in its
proximity. The malicious NFC provides an URL/URI to attack
the user’s device, as the Android system does not request
any user intervention, the device will automatically open the
provided link by either other smartphone or NFC-tag. This
situation opens security and privacy threads for the device’s
owner. Once, the device opens the link, it can be attacked
by fingerprinting mechanisms or share the user’s location for
example (see more details in Section IV. The URI can also
open application services such as contacts to automatically
add malicious contacts without user permission request.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this Section we proceed to enumerate the different
attacks that can be leveraged using the NFC protocol and
Android devices. Due to the myriad of Android devices and the
different configurations regarding hardware and software, the
proposed and also claimed vulnerabilities in this section can be
TABLE I: A table comparing different mobile devices tested
Device Android OS Stock Version Browsers
One Plus 3T Android 7.1.1 Stock
Chrome
Firefox
Pyro
Xiaomi Mi3W Android 5.1 MIUI 7
Chrome
Firefox
Native Browser
Xiaomi Mi3W Android 6.0.1 MIUI 8
Chrome
Firefox
Native Browser
Samsung C7 Android 6.0.1 Touchwiz
Chrome
Firefox
Native Browser
effective or not. We have tested several device configurations,
see Table I.
Android NFC aims to work seamlessly without user in-
tervention. However, once the device is unlocked and NFC
enabled, it starts looking for nearby NFC tags in order to read
the data stored. This scenario can lead to our proposed attack:
open a new channel to attack user’s device. The attack can
be a fingerprint of the device, gather user’s geo-location, or
lead to more sophisticated attacks such as taking advantage of
already logged sites to take actions (i.e., liked a specific web
site via Facebook), gather social network information from
user’s profile. Furthermore, we can use some user’s default
application permission to access via browsers (i.e., Chrome,
Native, Firefox) device’s microphone, camera or in cases of
documented and not patched security threads: the device’s file
system. Not every Android user is experienced with technical
details, application permissions, and not every Android device
is updated with the latest version. Therefore, the scenario
that can lead to last mentioned more harmful and privacy
concerned (i.e., eavesdropping user surroundings) is feasible.
In the following Section we will discuss the situations where
the user is aware of the attack (i.e., detects the browsers
opening).
The attack can be achieved placing NFC-tags that unlocked
Android devices will read in several locations: (1) public
transport: in areas where the public transport uses NFC reader
we can track user’s movement from one station to another,
collect the user’s routine information (i.e., when the user goes
to work and back home, where does he work); (2) coffee
shop, poster at shopping mall : placing NFC-tags under coffee
tables or in locations where users tend to leave the device
unlocked, we can collect not only device’s information but also
the geo-location as we know where the tag is located. For both
situations, we can also collect the mentioned social network
profiles or leverage more complex attacks in combination with
other documented browser vulnerabilities.
Listing 1: Facebook API like url
curl -X POST \
-F ’access_token=USER_ACCESS_TOKEN’ \
-F ’object=OG_OBJECT_URL’ \
https://graph.facebook.com/[User FB ID]/og.likes
(a) Chrome location pop-up
(b) Safari location pop-up
Fig. 4: Browser location-request information pop-ups
Facebook Graph API, the NFC-tag can leverage attacks such
as the liking of custom web pages directly from the URL
without user intervention (Listing 1), we only need to send the
tag to a device which is already logged in the social network.
Other social networks such as Twitter provides web intents to
redirect to follow specific web pages (Listing 2), the attacker
can use the Twitter API to follow the web pages that she wants.
Some of the current mentioned social APIs, might require user
intervention such as in the cases of following a user. There is
always the possibility of create a fake account/application to
confuse the user and leverage the action with user intervention
(permission).
Listing 2: Twitter follow web intent example
h t t p s : / / t w i t t e r . com / i n t e n t / f o l l o w ? u s e r i d
=2244994945
There are other possibilities which can lead to more harmful
situations than social networks, online banking systems can be
the targets of such attacks, with similar methods. The attacker
can use the parameters embedded in the URL, and write the
URL in the NFC tag. As an example, see Listing 3, the attack
can perform more sophisticated attacks such as send money
from the user account to the attacker one.
Listing 3: Bank URL example
\ p r o t e c t \ v r u l e w i d t h 0 p t \ p r o t e c t \ h r e f { h t t p
: / / b a n k s i t e . com / MyAccount / t r a n s f e r ?
a c c o u n t =}{ h t t p : / / b a n k s i t e . com /
MyAccount / t r a n s f e r ? a c c o u n t =}”
t r a n s f e r t o ”&amount=” wanted amount ”
Another privacy concern is user’s geo-location tracking.
Modern browsers have already solved this privacy issue with
a warning pop-up message to inform the user about the
server requesting permission to track user’s location, Figure 4.
The Android-NFC protocol enables an automatic and non-
user intervention access to the tagged URL. This issue opens
new possibilities to provide user location to services that
are interested. The location of the NFC is known, so the
attacker only needs to include the geo-location parameters
into the URL, once the user’s device is near the NFC tag,
this will automatically open the user’s device browser with
the sensitive location information that will be collected by the
server. Furthermore, we can include other device’s parameters
using JavaScript; which is enabled by default in the majority
of mobile browsers. As Listing 4 illustrates the URL can track
and generate a user fingerprint with the location collected
in the URL parameters. In the previous example we have
used the library provided by Valve5. There is extensive work
and real attacks that use the Cookies to track and collect
users’ information [4], [5]. URL/URI spoofing can also add
automatically malicious content on user’s device such as
contacts (text/vcard 5) without user’s intervention.
Listing 4: Website that generates a user’s fingerprint and
collects it in the server side
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>Example "Fingerprinting" Application</title>
<script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-1.11.3.min.js"></script>
<script src="https://valve.github.io/fingerprintjs2/fingerprint2.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Fingerprint Example</h1>
<div id="result"></div>
<code id="components"></code>
<script>
console.log("test");
setTimeout(function () {
window.location.href = "https://www.google.com"; //will redirect
}, 200); //will call the function after 200 (X) milliseconds or ready().
new Fingerprint2().get(function(result, components){
// this will use all available fingerprinting sources
console.log(result);
$(’#result’).text(JSON.stringify(result));
// components is an array of all fingerprinting components used
console.log(components);
$(’#components’).text(JSON.stringify(components));
//Send components fingerprint to server
$.ajax({
url: ’localhost:8882/collectFingerprint’,
type: ’POST’,
contentType:’application/json’,
data: JSON.stringify(result),
dataType:’json’
});
});
</script>
</body>
</html>
5https://github.com/Valve/fingerprintjs2
Fig. 5: Device fingerprinting using the NFC tag
Listing 5: URI VCARD contact, it creates a contact in the
user’s device without user intervention
BEGIN:VCARD
VERSION:4.0
N:MC;Mr.;
FN:Malicious Contact
TEL;TYPE=work,voice;VALUE=uri:tel:+123
EMAIL:maliciouscontact@example.com
END:VCARD
Listing 6: URL track user’s location (i.e. latitude and longi-
tude)
\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http://localhost:8888?lat=1}{http://localhost
:8888?lat=1}&long=3
Listing 7: PHP server to track device’s location and set user’s
cookie
<?php
$value = ’something from somewhere a cookie 3’;
setcookie("TestCookie", $value);
$parts = parse_url($url);
echo $_GET["lat"];
echo $_GET["long"];
?>
<html>
<head>
<title>PHP Test</title>
</head>
<body>
<?php echo ’<p>Hello World</p>’; ?>
<?php echo $_COOKIE["TestCookie"]; ?>
</body>
</html>
V. DISCUSSION
We mentioned some of the vulnerabilities we have found in
the Android-NFC ecosystem. In our proposed attack the user
can collect user’s device information, location, social network
profile, or listen to private conversations in situations where
the browser permission are enabled. The proposed threads and
vulnerabilities can leverage more sophisticated attacks if they
are combined with known mobile browser vulnerabilities, or
in the case of logged web sites such as Facebook, Banks, the
attacker can create defined actions that can take advantage of
the already logged situation.
We propose possible solutions to avoid this harmful situa-
tions on mobile NFC-enabled environments. One solution to
avoid the privacy leakage is in cases where the NFC reads
an URL/URI it request user’s permission to access the link.
Another solution can work analogous as with BLE Beacons,
once the device’s reads a URL/URI it creates a notification in
the notification bar, so the user can access the address when
she desires (no work-flow interruption).
VI. RELATED WORK
In this literature review we depict the state of art of NFC
protocol vulnerabilities, mobile device fingerprinting tech-
niques, and wireless location-based methods using wireless
protocols.
The NFC communication protocol is vulnerable to several
threads [6]: eavesdropping, it is a key thread of wireless
communications, as the data transmitted via NFC channel can
be intercepted or received by an attacker; data corruption, the
data transmitted can be modified (corrupted) by an attacker.
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and NFC-tag overwriting can
be considered within this thread group; data modification;
data insertion, during the exchange of messages data can
be inserted; man-in-the-middle attacks. Mulliner et al. [3]
identify a number of vulnerabilities and threads on NFC-
enabled mobile phones: mobile telephony service attacks,
using URI spoofing the attacker can leverage malicious SMS,
telephone receiver number; URI/URL spoofing, URL spoofing
enabled via NFC communication protocol; DoS. In [7], the
authors contribute with the enumeration of more possible NFC
attacks: relay attack, request confidential information from the
secure element (more information Section II); phising attack,
NFC tag that will execute commands in the user’s device(i.e.,
send email, WiFi AP connection setup); ticket cloning, related
to the copy of e-tickets. Eun et al. [8] propose conditional
privacy protections against impersonation attacks from NFC
eavesdropping (man-in-the-middle) using the user’s public
key schemes, pseudonyms and addition trusted third party to
protect the privacy of users.
Mobile device’s fingerprinting is the information collected
via web-based methods (i.e., JavaScript, browser-plugins,
cookies), sensor-based (i.e., accelerometer, GPS, WiFi). Hup-
perich et al. [9] propose a system with modern web-based
fingerprinting techniques, for mobile devices. The authors
discover that some features used in desktop environments lose
their importance in mobile fingerprinting environments. They
also test the proposed system against evasion attacks such as
changeability of features (i.e., use of a second browser, proxy).
The authors mention that the browser plugins and extensions,
due to the complexity of commercial browsers, are the biggest
thread in device’s web-based fingerprinting. AppPrint learns
(a) iOS app permission requests. The
permission requests are shown when the
application needs to access the particu-
lar restricted resource (after installation)
such as contacts, camera, location
(b) Android app permission before
Marshmallow (Android 6.0). The app per-
mission are requested before installing
the app
(c) Android app permission settings since
Marshmallow (Android 6.0). The user can
change the app permission in settings
menu
Fig. 6: Application permission information
mobile app fingerprints from traffic observations [10]. The
system is capable of identifying with high granularity installed
mobile applications based on the network traffic they generate.
However, the deployment of the system is situated in the
network provider side (i.e., network administrator). In [11],
the authors present a sensor-based fingerprinting approach
using speaker and accelerometer’s device. The authors’ work
raises open problems regarding the fingerprinting using other
mobile device’s sensors. Kurtz et al. [4] present an innova-
tive software-based approach to fingerprinting mobile devices
using the user’s personalized configurations. The proposed ap-
proach uses a third party application, instead of the most used
web browser channel, to obtain a unique device fingerprint.
However, in third party application approaches for Android
and iOS platforms the user needs to grant app permission in
order for the app to access the sensors (see Figure 6).
Furthermore, fingerprinting of user’s location is a very
important feature, that we have described with the sensor-
based fingerpringting related work. Although, there are other
approaches to track user’s indoor location as we will enumer-
ate. There are myriad related work on location-based methods
using wireless such as WiFi, Bluetooth, ultra wide band
(UWB) sensors ([12], [13]). In this paper [14], the authors
present a computational approach to speedup tradition indoor
WiFi location-based methods. Although these methods can
track device’s location within a particular environment (i.e.,
shopping malls) using wireless methods, it lacks of user’s
traceability and it requires installation of the system either
on the user’s device, or access point (AP) mesh networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we depict the current state of mobile NFC-
enabled ecosystem’s vulnerabilities and threads. Some pre-
vious work attacks still can be enabled in current NFC
communications and the situation of application permission on
Android devices. The latter is still a difficult scenario due to
the differences between OS versions, how the OS approaches
the permission requests (before app installation), and the non
technical experience Android users. Furthermore, the location-
based tracking attempts have been solved by browser location-
request notifications. However, NFC-tags provide a simple
and non-user intervention channel to track user’s location,
fingerprinting, and other logged-based web sites attacks. In
summary, our proposed attack enables current mobile finger-
printing techniques using the NFC-tags and URL/URI An-
droid mobile device’s vulnerabilities. To conclude, we propose
simple deployable solutions that will not interrupt the user-
workflow to enable a secure and privacy aware NFC-Android
ecosystem.
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